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*Reg P. O'Brien*  
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
(Part 1)

TITLE: B.B.C. Reporting on crisis in  
JORDAN.

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PART

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Regy C.W.L.	1-3	22/6 22/6 25/6	Regy C.W.L.		19/F 21/8			
Regy C.W.L.	4(S)	25/6	S.I.P.D.		1/10			
Mr. Maxwell	FILE	10/VII	Regy C.W.L. & onwards		31/10			
Mr. Brinson		1/7	B.S.		6/11			
Mr. Hannington Regist.		15.VII	Regy		28/11			
C.W.L.	6-8	12/7	FCO	17	1084			
Dft to use. then p.a. 15/7		20/7.						
Regy. (P.D.)	10.	31/7. 31/VIII						
Mr. Brinson min	13/VII							
Mr. Morgan. re		14/8						
Mr. Gaydon re		12/8-						
Mr. Brinson -								



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YEAR STAMP

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## **USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE**

**LAST FILE:** \_\_\_\_\_

NEXT FILE: Next 13

**OTHER RELATED FILES:** \_\_\_\_\_

DESPATCH FROM BEIRUT  
BY ROLAND CHALLIS

FRIDAY, 12th June, 1970

2030 (In N.T.U.2130)

N. 26

CUE: .... exhausted by three days of crisis. Nevertheless, three West European Embassies have begun evacuating their women and children. A report from Roland Challis, just back in Beirut from Amman, where Palestine guerrillas detained him as hostage for two days.

I flew out of Amman with nearly three hundred evacuees, seventy of them West Germans and the rest Americans, in aircraft chartered by the International Red Cross. Most of them were women and children. Day two of the evacuation is reserved for an estimated two hundred and fifty British women and children, who, I am told, will go to Cyprus. A West German diplomat told me one reason for the evacuation was threats of violence against the three embassies at the height of the crisis. Those of us arrested as hostages in two hotels were mainly British and American or West Germans. And Palestinians in the afflicted Camp Wahdat assured me these three Western countries had been behind the Jordanian Government plot to eliminate the Palestinian leaders. But perhaps more persuasive than any threat is the conviction of some observers that there's still more trouble to come. Although both Jordanians and Palestinians told me King Husseir's dismissal of his uncle - Sherif Naser - from command of the Armed Forces had created an irreversible situation, some people question whether Sherif Naser, or even Hussein himself will accept this. I am told that loyalist troops, loyal to Sherif Naser, are still concentrating outside Amman, and I myself saw a lot of tanks and armour as we flew out of the capital. My captors told me guerrillas has knocked out a lot of tanks since the fighting began in Amman, and spread to other areas last Saturday. They claim that they control not only the centre of Amman but also the whole northern region of Jordan, where, they say, they have the support of many Jordanian troops. The routine claim that the crisis has divided the Army seemed on this occasion to be true and is thought to explain the King's capitulation to demands pressed on him, and in another sense, on the other guerrilla groups by the triumphant Communist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It was this group, led by George Wahdat which threatened to blow up two hotels, with us inside them, if the government did not sack Sherif

... 103 C.R. 82.  
MORE..

Naser, release some two hundred detained guerrillas, and stop bombarding refugee camps. This bombardment, they say, was still going on as late as Thursday at Bakaa outside Amman. A visit to the Ashrafiyeh Hospital, one of Amman's five government hospitals, gave me some measure of the bloodshed there's been, mainly among the Palestinians. I was told the hospital had handled four hundred casualties and one hundred and seventy dead. People were still queuing to get in. Other Amman hospitals are all packed and we know nothing of the rest of the country. The bloodshed alone has given this episode the calibre of a civil war.

Releasing us this morning George Wahdat said he was convinced King Hussein had seen this as a final attempt to destroy the Palestinian revolution. In fact, he told me, the King had yielded to all his demands. He might have added, but didn't, that he scored an equally important victory over Palestinian moderates led by Yassir Arafat. Palestinians have been bush here in Beirut too, with an evening demonstration outside the Jordanian Embassy. June 15th is the deadline for guerrilla groups not properly organised in Lebanon to obey a government regulation forbidding the carrying of arms, and there could be more trouble then.

Roland Challis, B.B.C. Beirut.

EN/2200

END

CYPER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELNO 289

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

14 JUNE 1970

Mr. hong VPT  
WD

on A. who figures known  
to C. and in his work

CONFIDENTIAL.

— This telegram in  
action on NEJIL

B. Representat

RBC

C. And in his work

RBC

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP AND SUPPORT WE WERE GIVEN IN ARRANGING TO EVACUATE BRITISH SUBJECTS. OUR COMMUNITY NOW PROBABLY NUMBERS ABOUT 300. BUT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO CHECK WITH EACH FAMILY WE SHALL NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER.

15.6

170- A

200

2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM MANY PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS OF THEIR RELIEF THAT WE HAD NOT CARRIED OUT A TOTAL EVACUATION, AS THE BBC HAD UNFORTUNATELY LED THEM TO BELIEVE. THE FACT THAT WE ARE STILL HERE AND VERY MUCH IN BUSINESS HAS HAD A TOUCHINGLY CALMING EFFECT ON MANY LOCAL PEOPLE.

B

3. THE HAZARDS TO WHICH BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN EXPOSED DURING THE CRISIS HAVE BEEN SEVERE AND IT IS FRANKLY MIRACULOUS THAT WE HAVE HAD NO CASUALTIES FROM PEOPLE LIVING IN VIRTUALLY A BATTLEFIELD. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE HOTEL HOSTAGE INCIDENT, HAVE BEEN OF AN INCIDENTAL NATURE AND LITTLE HOSTILITY WAS SHOWN TO BRITISH SUBJECTS. WHEN FEDAYEEN ENTERED BRITISH HOUSES, IT WAS FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES AND THEIR CONDUCT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GENERALLY COURTEOUS.

4. AS YOU KNOW, WITH THIS SORT OF CRISIS IN MIND, MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAVE FOR THE PAST YEAR BEEN WORKING HARD TO LET THE PALESTINIANS KNOW INFORMALLY THAT WE UNDERSTAND THEIR ASPIRATIONS. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A DELEGATE TO THE RECENT PALESTINIAN CONGRESS IN CAIRO THAT FAVOURABLE PUBLIC REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THIS IN CLOSED SESSION.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. AT PRESENT, SECURITY IN AMMAN RESTS WITH JOINT FEDAYEEN/POLICE AND ARMY PATROLS AND SENTRYES, BUT THE FACTS OF POWER WITHIN AMMAN NOW INDICATE THAT IN EFFECT WE MUST RELY PRINCIPALLY UPON THE FEDAYEEN FOR OUR SAFETY, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

6. WE HAVE BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE CAREFUL WAY IN WHICH HMG HAS AVOIDED PROVOCATION OF THE PALESTINIANS AND I HOPE THAT THIS MAY CONTINUE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE BBC COULD BE PERSUADED TO EXERCISE CARE AND TO CEASE REFERRING TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL MOVEMENT AS "ARAB GUERILLAS" WHICH IS REGARDED AS REFLECTION OF ISRAELI TERMINOLOGY. THEY PREFER TO BE CALLED "PALESTINIANS".

SIR P. ADAMS

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CRED BOT.

MR. A.S. FAIR,  
ODM ELAND HOUSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CYP11A1/CAT/HM

FLASH AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO. 274

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

NEOKI

Coin Foe

TO F.C.O. NET 13  
12 JUNE 1978.

# TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 274 DATED 12 JUNE AND TO FLASH  
HQ NEAF NICOSIA AND BEIRUT.

TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE AMBASSADOR/TRIPP 121630Z EVACUATION.

I C R C HAVE NOW OFFERED TO PROVIDE ABOUT 40 SEATS ON  
AN AIRCRAFT ETD AMMAN APPROX 1130Z AND ABOUT 100 SEATS ETD  
APPROX 1430Z. ETA BEIRUT ABOUT 45 MINUTES LATER IN EACH CASE.  
THIS IS ON THE UNDERSTANDING

(A) THAT THEY ARE OPERATING ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT ON 13 JUNE AND

(B) THAT FEDAYEEN CO-OPERATION IS FORTHCOMING. THERE IS SOME DOUBT ABOUT THIS FOLLOWING BROADCAST ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT AN AMERICAN DIVISION IS STANDING BY TO TAKE OUT U.S. CITIZENS BY FORCE IF REQUIRED.

2. I FEAR THIS MEANS WE SHALL NOT HAVE A FIRM FLIGHT PLAN UNTIL THE MORNING. MEANWHILE WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH DOCUMENTATIONS IN THE HOPE THAT FLIGHTS WILL MATERIALISE.

**DEFCOMCEN PASS FLASH TO HQ NEAF**

FCO PASS FLASH TO NICOSIA AND DEFCOMCEN

SIR P. ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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**NR. EASTERN DEPT.  
PERS. SERVICES DEPT.**

**COPIES TO:**

MR. A.S. FAIR, O.D.M.  
ELAND HOUSE.  
MR. J. ASHWOOD, C.R.E.D., B.O.T.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

see f (36).

NINJIN

13.6.70

CORRECTION TO DESPATCH

4

CORRECTION TO DESPATCH FROM BEIRUT BY ROLAND CHALLIS: XN 23/224

N 26, Friday 12th June 1970:

Please delete third and fourth sentences: "Day two ....  
of the crisis".

F. O. says number of Britons is one hundred and thirty; and  
"no threat was made against the British Embassy.

END CORRECTION TVN

1143, 13th CKB



CONFIDENTIAL

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

(3)

18 June, 1970

(NEJ.1/4)

NE J 13/1

P.C.W.  
22/6

B.B.C. Reporting on Jordan

f(53) NEJ 1/4

In Amman telegrams No. 274 (para. 1(b)) and No. 275 (para. 3) you mentioned some difficulties caused by the reporting by the BBC World Service on the Jordanian troubles. You will have seen from F.C.O. telegram no. 16/-f(60) that some of the damage was corrected as rapidly as we could arrange for this to be done. I enclose the official text of the broadcast in question, now received. We heard of similar problem through other channels also: Gordon King of the American Embassy here telephoned on 13 June to complain that, although the BBC had broadcast the (false) report from Washington that the 82nd Airborne Division was on stand-by to intervene in Jordan, they had completely disregarded Secretary of State Rogers's express denial of that report. The Americans were understandably anxious about the harm this might cause. We also heard from another source on 13 June that the BBC report about the size of the British evacuation and the alleged attack on the Embassy had caused distress in other quarters in Amman. Fortunately, however, this particular storm (or part of it) seems to have blown over.

NEJ 1/7

2. We have noted the suggestion in your telegram No. 28/-w(1) that we might ask the BBC to avoid the expression "Arab guerrillas" and to use instead the term "Palestinians". We have put the idea to them informally. They have told us that, par contre, they have been under pressure from the Israeli Embassy to call the fedayeen not "guerrillas" but "terrorists"! I myself should have thought that the overtones of the word "guerrilla" were entirely "respectable" these days for the Arabs. It is also relevant that the World Service uses for its news bulletins material drawn from the internal services, and so use the same wording. There are obvious snags for the BBC in calling the fedayeen simply "Palestinians"; to use the term could be taken to imply that the person or organisation concerned believes that Palestine ought to exist as a political entity. Be that as it may, we shall have to leave it to the BBC to decide how best to describe them.

(C.W.Long)

C. D. Lush Esq.,  
AMMAN

c.c. Mr. Massingham, I.P.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

EL CLAIR

FLASH ALERT TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO. 275 — IN ACTION 13 JUNE 1970

UNCLASSIFIED NEJ 117 f (4S)

Mr Brumpton W(4)  
NB  
NB  
—  
15/

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 275 DATED 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO IMMEDIATE MOD D14 JIS(NE) JIS GULF HQBFNE BEIRUT CAIRO  
TEL AVIV BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

NY TEL NO 273 (NOT TO ALL) INTERNAL SITUATION REPORT:

THE TOWN IS CALMER. REPORTS FROM REFUGEE CAMPS HOWEVER INDICATE THAT THEIR INHABITANTS ARE IN A SURLY MOOD AND THAT DAMAGE TO LIVES AND PROPERTY IS VERY CONSIDERABLE. MANY ARE ONCE AGAIN HOMELESS AND ARE LIVING IN OPEN FIELDS. PARTICULAR RESENTMENT IS FELT AGAINST ROYAL FAMILY SINCE SOME OF THE SHELLS WITH WHICH CAMPS WERE ATTACKED CAME FROM PALACE AREA.

2. THE KING IS ALSO BEING CRITICISED BY SOME TRADITIONAL LOYALISTS FOR HAVING GOT HIMSELF INTO A SITUATION WHERE HE HAD TO CLIMB DOWN IN THE FACE OF PRESSURE FROM LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN.

3. THE MOST HOPEFUL SIGN IS THE DEVELOPING COLLABORATION OF ONE CHIEF-OF-STAFF MASHUR AND ARAFAT. BUT THEY ARE SAID TO BE TAKING THE PARTIAL EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS BADLY AND AS A SIGN OF NO CONFIDENCE. OUR OWN POSITION IS NOT HELPED BY THE BBC BROADCASTS OF EXAGGERATED FIGURES (250 INSTEAD OF ABOUT 130) AND STATEMENT THAT THIS EMBASSY WAS THREATENED WITH DESTRUCTION, NOR IS THEIRS. NO REPEAT NO THREATS WERE RECEIVED BY US AT ANY TIME AND IT IS DAMAGING TO OUR POSITION HERE TO SAY THEY WERE.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

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AT THE MOMENT TRAFFIC IN THE MAIN IS MOVING WELL BUT THERE  
ARE STILL REPORTS OF INCIDENTS AT FEDAYEEN-MAHNE ROADBLOCKS.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DIA JIS(NE) JIS GULF AND HQBNE

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

CIR P. ADAMS

[REMOVED AS UNJASSED]  
[DATA TO D.O.C.]

R. Benson HQ  
? ?

CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELNO 289 - f 60 NEJ17

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

14 JUNE 1970

In Action  
CN

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP AND SUPPORT WE WERE GIVEN IN ARRANGING TO EVACUATE BRITISH SUBJECTS. OUR COMMUNITY NOW PROBABLY NUMBERS ABOUT 300. BUT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO CHECK WITH EACH FAMILY WE SHALL NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER.

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
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ODM ELAND HOUSE.

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I.R. Requ'ry

Ram <sup>Kawhi</sup> <sup>(4)</sup>  
In Action NE J 17 15<sup>th</sup>

Amman Telegrams Nos. 275 and 289. Action was already  
--- in hand when I received your attached copies.

2. The misstatements referred to in paragraph 3 of telegram No. 275 were corrected over the weekend, after we had spoken to the BBC. I hope that, similarly, the misunderstanding referred to in paragraph 2 of telegram No. 289 has been cleared up.

3. So far as paragraph 6 of telegram No. 289 is concerned, the BBC's News Department is sympathetic, but further action may be necessary. Mr. Tripp wanted to talk to the BBC himself, but the latter preferred to deal with this Department or News Department. I am pursuing the matter.

D. N. Brinson  
(D. N. Brinson)  
15 June, 1970

jnb  
22 June

per un  
25/6

CONFIDENTIAL

W(5)

CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELNO 289 IN ~~Rehovot~~  
NE 5117

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
14 JUNE 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. F (60)

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

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/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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b7c

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SIR P. ADAMS

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MR. A.S. FAIR,  
ODM ELAND HOUSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

W (S)

RECORDED IN POKERET AND CLEM HEDALON OFFICE

TEL NO. 275 IN ACTION 13 JUNE 1970

RECORDED ON NEJILY,  
F (53),

ADDRESSED TO ECO TEL NO 275 DATED 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO IMMEDIATE MOD DIA JIS(NE) JIS GULF HQBNE BEIRUT CAIRO  
TEL AVIV BAGHDAD TRIPOLI WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

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DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DIA JIS(LE) JIS GULF AND HQBNE

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPLACED AS REQUESTED]  
[SEND TO D.C.C.]

12.00 AM 25 NOV 1973  
H. BRUNNEN D.

12.00 AM

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Reference PBM 5/414/1


Mr. Brinson: Thank you *thus ad finitum* (5)

BBC Reporting on Jordan

In Action  
NET 11

IN ACTION  
18 JUN 70

Amman telegrams Nos. 275 & 289, copies below.



2. The eventual view taken in the Office - admittedly taken with the benefit of hindsight - about the various points of criticism raised by Amman was that our Embassy had become understandably supersensitive in the heat of the crisis. For example, you will see from the attached text of Roland Challis' original despatch to which objections were raised in the first telegram under reference, that his references to possible physical threats to our Embassy (and others) were based upon an attributed conversation with a West German diplomat and further founded upon conversations with "fedayeen". Both sources, in the circumstances, were at least "well-placed".

3. The BBC proved wholly cooperative and helpful and no follow-up action is necessary. An appropriately soothing reply (text also below) has been sent to our Embassy in Amman on the basis of a draft agreed with me.

J.D.  
Massingham

18.VI.70

pm  
un  
25/6

CONFIDENTIAL

mfa  
P.D.  
H 22/6

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 56  
- 9 JUL 1970


copy to Birmingham (RD) 30/6  
Mr Evans  
Mr Tuff 6/7

CONFIDENTIAL

NEJ 13 | (iii) sent me  
These are examples.  
are examples.

30/6

Dear Long,



Or 6/7  
1. I.A. Dept and (b)  
3. News Dept  
should see. There  
are some points  
2. I.P.D.  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN. P.M.  
12/7

\* 25 June, 1970  
her which might be  
Police BBC information.

R. M. Evans

(3) Many thanks for your letter of 18 June to Christopher Lush. We were grateful for the quick correction of Roland Challis's piece on 12 June; this produced favourable comment here and was helpful to us.

(2) 2. I fear our Telegram No. 274 must have misled you. It is not the term "guerillas" in the B.B.C.'s standard "Arab guerillas" nomenclature that gives offence here, but the "Arab" bit, which is taken as going along with the Israeli line that "there are no Palestinians" and that "the terrorists" are simply paid tools of the Arab governments. In short, Jordanians feel that it is biased for the B.B.C. to refer to a man as a "Palestinian refugee" only until he takes up arms to recover his homeland, when he ceases to be deemed "Palestinian". Thus "Palestinian guerillas" or "Palestinian Arab guerillas" would be quite acceptable. Scottish or Welsh nationalists are after all British, but would be reasonably offended if they were called "British nationalists"!

3. Incidentally, Radio Israel's adherence to the term "terrorist" leads them into some absurdities! Thus we have heard broadcasts from Israel implying that the terrorists are maintaining law and order in Amman!

X 4. On the more general question of B.B.C. reporting on Jordan, I fear that their reputation has been suffering somewhat, not so much from bias as from sheer inaccuracy. This is always a risk in reporting from Beirut. Ivor Jones, for example, has visited Amman precisely once for one night since the June '67 war! Roland Challis has been here once or twice this last year apart from the time of his incarceration in the Philadelphia Hotel, but Jordan has been outside his normal bailiwick. However, Maurice Gent is now with us and we can only hope he gets the feel of things here before too long.

Y 5. The B.B.C. is still widely listened to, in Arabic and English, particularly in time of crisis, and I hope they are aware of the importance of having a first class and experienced correspondent out here, not least because Jordan's own information services are so utterly inept.

Yours sincerely,

(B. L. Strachan)

Ben Strachan

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dent.,  
F.C.O.


Note: I have spoken with BSBC Dip.  
Unit about these points & will  
write to Mr. Williams of XENO.

Enter & reir

CONFIDENTIAL

NEJ 1/4

J. D. Postlethwaite  
DIP. 9/7/71



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

7

NEJ 13/1

14 July 1970

F m  
17/7

You may recall that, on Saturday 13 June, your Department kindly agreed to correct a despatch from Roland Challis about the situation in Jordan, in which our Embassy in Amman had pointed out two errors of fact. We have now had a letter from the Embassy saying how grateful they were for the quick correction, which produced favourable and helpful comment in a tricky situation. I am pleased to be able to pass this on to you.

At that time I discussed with Tony Paynting and Andrew Walker how best the "fedayeen" could be designated. The Palestinian National Movement are apparently sensitive about being called "Arab guerillas", which is how they are usually and not inaccurately described in your bulletins. However, it seems that they believe that particular phrase reflects Israeli terminology and would much prefer to be called "Palestinians". We took your point that not all Palestinians are guerillas and that almost any description would arouse someone's susceptibilities.

Nevertheless, you may be interested to know that our Embassy in Amman have now enlarged upon their earlier telegraphic commentary on this difficult semantic point. It is not - as we had originally thought - the term "guerillas" that gives offence, but the adjective "Arab". This is taken to be a virtual acceptance of the Israeli line that "there are no Palestinians". Thus the term "Palestinian guerillas" or "Palestinian Arab guerillas" would be more acceptable. I suppose the point is roughly analogous to calling Welsh or Scottish Nationalists, who are indubitably British, "British Nationalists".

All this is very tricky not least when I understand it has been suggested that the guerillas ought to be described as "terrorists". Nevertheless, perhaps you might care to consider the point further?

(J.D. Massingham)

P.G. Williams, Esq.,  
News Department,  
British Broadcasting Corporation,  
Bush House,  
Aldwych,  
W.C.2.

RESTRICTED

Reference

NEJ 13/1

Mr. Brinson  
*has seen*

(8)

f(5)

B.B.C. Reporting on Jordan

My minute of 18 June.

P.M.  
17/7

f(6) 2. You may now like to see Mr. Strachan's letter of 25 June at (6).

f(7) 3. I have written to the B.B.C. News Department about the relatively trivial point raised in paragraph two of that letter. But the succeeding paragraphs raise matters of greater importance.

4. The B.B.C. maintain three Correspondents in the Arab World, based in Beirut, Cairo and Tunis respectively. Part of the trouble of which Amman is complaining may be due to the fact that the Correspondent in Beirut is controlled by the Domestic Services' News Department, whereas the other two are part of the External Services. It is my understanding that there is currently some internal struggle within the B.B.C. about the future of overseas Correspondents. The domestic services because of financial pressures and one suspects a more frivolous approach to "news" are reluctant to maintain these expensive posts overseas. (The Central European Correspondent - a key post - for example has been withdrawn and the position filled temporarily by the External Services having sent out their senior Diplomatic Correspondent). However, so long as the B.B.C. external broadcasting remains a major part of Britain's Information effort, it is essential that it has the resources to ensure adequate coverage overseas, since consistent inaccuracy would soon destroy the universal credibility which is the B.B.C.'s undoubted strength. This is a matter of interest well beyond my own two parishes, and it may well be a topic that is already receiving attention within this Office. If not, then perhaps it is something on which it might be useful to take some soundings?

J.D.  
Massingham

(J.D. Massingham )  
Information Policy Dept.

14 July 1970

P.D.  
J.D.M.  
14/7/70

Mr. Massingham.  
H. Macmillan has touched on this in his talks with Domestic TV News. On External Services Correspondents B.B.C. are limited by our subscription.  
But we know they are active even if "Domestic" are not.

RESTRICTED

G.D.M.  
14/7/70

9

CONFIDENTIAL

Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

NEJ 13/1

20 July, 1970

Jordan

f6

Please refer to Ben Strachan's letter of 25 June on this subject.

2. IPD have put the points in paragraphs 2,4 and 5 of that letter to the BBC, and we hope they will take heed. With regard to the point in your paragraph 4, part of the trouble seems to be due to the fact that the Correspondent in Beirut is controlled by the Domestic Services' News Department, whereas the other ... part of the External Services. The domestic services because of financial pressures and one suspects a more frivolous approach to "news" are reluctant to ... in these expensive posts overseas. (The Central European Correspondent - a key post - for example has been withdrawn and the position filled temporarily by the External Services having sent out their senior Diplomatic Correspondent). However, so long as the B.B.C. external broadcasting remains a major part of Britain's Information effort, it is essential that it has the resources to ensure adequate coverage overseas, since consistent inaccuracy would soon destroy the universal credibility which is the B.B.C.'s undoubted strength.

3. We are grateful to you for taking up these points: if things do not improve, please let me know.

(C. W. Long)

C. D. Lush, Esq.,  
AMMAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 66 (SIC)

30 JULY 1970

RESTRICTED

10  
Req. for his up  
and time to Mr.  
Massyuan (P.D.)

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 66 OF 30 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN IMMEDIATE.

from...  
21/7  
Telegram 77  
Top Copy has not  
arrived as yet

at Main A  
(268)

AMMAN TELNO. 77 OF 23 JULY TO ME: BBC CORRESPONDENT.

WE HAVE SPOKEN TO IVOR JONES, WHOSE EXPLANATION

IS AS FOLLOWS. HE IS MOST ANXIOUS TO VISIT

AMMAN, BUT IS INHIBITED BY POLICY OF BBC, WHICH

REQUIRES HIM TO BE IN BEIRUT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE

OR LESS DAILY TELEPHONED SNIPPETS FOR HOME SERVICE.

HE IS HOWEVER SURE THAT HE WOULD GET PERMISSION

TO GO TO AMMAN IF THE AUDIENCE REFERRED TO WERE WITH

THE KING HIMSELF. GRATEFUL IF AMMAN COULD CONFIRM

WHETHER THIS IS SO.

2. JONES WAS ANXIOUS THAT NO APPEARANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET HIS INSTRUCTIONS CHANGED BY A BACK DOOR BUT IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE USEFUL IF YOU COULD CHECK HIS STORY WITH BBC AND IF IT IS TRUE PERSUADE THEM OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING TWO CORRESPONDENTS DIVIDING THE MIDDLE EAST, ONE OF WHOM IS RESTRICTED IN HIS MOVEMENTS. IF CHALLIS WERE ALLOWED TO COVER AMMAN FROM CAIRO FOR THE WORLD AND ARABIC SERVICES, MR. PHILLIPS' POINT WOULD BE MET.

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

3. IN FAIRNESS TO JONES , IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS ON LEAVE DURING THE LAST CRISIS, AND THAT HE DOES NOT VISIT ISRAEL(PARA .2 OF AMMAN TEL. UNDER REF.)

MR. EDDEN

FILES

NEWS DEPT  
INF AD DEPT  
INF FOL DEPT  
N.D.D.  
SIR J. JOHNSTON

RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT/A

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 66 (sic)

30 JULY 1970

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO 9  
- 4 AUG 1970

NEW BRI

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 66 OF 30 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN IMMEDIATE.

AMMAN TELNO. 77 OF 28 JULY TO ME: BBC CORRESPONDENT.  
WE HAVE SPOKEN TO IVOR JONES, WHOSE EXPLANATION  
IS AS FOLLOWS. HE IS MOST ANXIOUS TO VISIT  
AMMAN, BUT IS INHIBITED BY POLICY OF BBC, WHICH  
REQUIRES HIM TO BE IN BEIRUT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE  
OR LESS DAILY TELEPHONED SNIPPETS FOR HOME SERVICE.  
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IT IS TRUE PERSUADE THEM OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF  
HAVING TWO CORRESPONDENTS DIVIDING THE MIDDLE EAST, ONE  
OF WHOM IS RESTRICTED IN HIS MOVEMENTS. IF CHALLIS  
WERE ALLOWED TO COVER AMMAN FROM CAIRO FOR THE WORLD  
AND ARABIC SERVICES, MR. PHILLIPS' POINT WOULD BE MET.

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

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MR. EDDEN

FILES

NEWS DEPT  
INF AD DEPT  
INF POL DEPT  
N.E.D.  
SIR J. JOHNSTON

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

U.S. EMBASSY  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 395

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
31 JULY 1970

11

RESTRICTED.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM ORIGINALLY ADDRESSED TO YOU SAVINGS IS ~~NOT REGISTERED~~  
REPEATED IMMEDIATE.

BEGIN.....

NEJ 13/1

ADDRESSED TO BEIRUT TELEGRAM NO 77 DATED 28 JULY 1970 AND SAVING  
TO F.C.O.

THE CROWN PRINCE AND ZEID RIFAI HAVE AGAIN REMONSTRATED  
STRONGLY AT B.B.C. NEWS AND NEWSCREELS ON 27 JULY, QUOTING THEIR  
BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT, STRESSING WIDENING RIFT IN THE ARAB RANKS  
AND MAGNIFYING POPULAR FRONT DEMONSTRATIONS IN AMMAN.  
THIS THEY SAY IS ADDING TO THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND WAS NOT BASED  
UPON AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS OR UPON OFFICIAL STATEMENTS  
BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

2. ZEID RIFAI HAS ASKED THAT WE CONVEY TO B.B.C. THEIR CONCERN  
THAT IAN JONES HAS NOT VISITED JORDAN MORE THAN FOR ONE DAY IN  
EIGHTEEN MONTHS, MUCH LESS ASKED FOR AUDIENCES SUCH AS ARE REGULARLY  
SOUGHT BY HIM IN TEL AVIV, AND ASKS THAT HE SHOULD COME HERE AS  
SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ASSURED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THAT IF HE DID SO,  
APPROPRIATE AUDIENCES WOULD BE GRANTED AND JONES GIVEN EVERY  
OPPORTUNITY TO FORM A BALANCED VIEW.

3. WHILE I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE JORDANIANS OFTEN FAIL TO GIVE  
ADEQUATE BRIEFINGS TO CORRESPONDENTS I FEEL THEY ARE ENTITLED TO  
EXPECT EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE MATTER OF AUDIENCES, AND THAT JONES'  
FAILURE TO VISIT AMMAN MORE FREQUENTLY IS A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR  
TO THE DECLINE OF B.B.C.'S REPUTATION FOR IMPARTIALITY HERE,  
WHERE THE SITUATION IS VOLATILE AND ILLFOUNDED COMMENT BY SUCH A  
WIDELY HEARD AND HITHERTO RESPECTED BROADCASTING SERVICE IS  
CAPABLE OF PRECIPITATING TROUBLE. INDEED I THINK THAT IN PRESENT  
CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH A VISIT IS URGENT BEFORE MORE DAMAGE BE DONE.

4. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SUGGEST TO JONES  
THAT HE ARRANGES TO VISIT AMMAN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, AND

/ASSURE

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

ASSURE HIM THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL GIVE HIM A FULL BRIEFING.

MUR. PHILLIPS

FILES

I.P.D.

NEWS DEPT

N.E.D.

I.A.D.

RESTRICTED

Confidential

(12)

69/1

British Embassy,  
BEIRUT

6 August, 1970.

13/1

Pg 1/ Copy at once to H.A.V. 12/8  
Massinglow, I.P.D. KPA

2/ Enter this copy & return  
to me soon.

Amman "18

Please refer to Amman telno. 77 of 28 July to Beirut  
and Beirut telno. 375 of 30 July to the F.C.O., about the  
B.B.C. Middle East correspondent, Ivor Jones.

2. Apart from the reasons given in our telegram Ivor Jones' manifest disinclination to stir from Beirut is possibly due to his having built up a local system of contacts and reporting by telephone which he regards as efficient and dependable at all times. Also Jones has an inflated ego, and regards himself as a cut above other correspondents. This has led him to take the absurdly pompous attitude that his head office will allow him to go to Amman only if he is offered an audience by the King. He has, however, following Alex Sinclair's conversation with Christopher Lush, modified this to the extent that he now says he would also visit Amman if a cease-fire is agreed, or if there is a reasonable prospect of an interview with the King. He has undertaken to keep us informed of his plans, and he is well aware that you and the Jordanian authorities are anxious that he should visit Amman without further delay.

(E. F. Given)

B. L. Strachan, Esq.,  
AMMAN

c.c. Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

Confidential

RESTRICTED

Reference...NEJ..13/1.....

W. 12

Mr. Brinson:

NET 13//

My minute of 3 August.

2. I have now spoken with Mr. Wyatt of IAD about the possible implications for his department of our raising with the BBC the problems -general and particular- of their overseas correspondents. He appreciates that such a discussion would lead to a number of far reaching matters of substance being aired, but foresees no difficulties provided that the BBC representatives are in no doubt that the discussions were purely exploratory and without commitment. He did not dissent from my view that there might be advantages in getting the BBC to speak candidly off-the -record about this and any other problems that might subsequently emerge in official discussions. Mr. Wyatt has, however, emphasized that the prospect of the BBC's getting a bigger subvention is remote. Indeed, it is possible that the grant-in-aid might even be reduced to allow for the increase in funds for the British Council recommended in the Duncan Report. In ~~any~~ case you may like to consider whether IAD should be present at whatever meeting is arranged with the BBC, though presumably that would depend on whom else were to accompany you.

3. The opportunity of such a meeting could be used to make a wide-ranging tour d'horizon of the BBC as seen by this department and I suggest that all the Regional Officers might usefully exchange ideas with you after one of our regular meetings about topics to be mooted. The particular topics which spring to mind at once are:

(a) The problems ~~and~~ control and deployment of overseas correspondents. Their cost effectiveness. The need for the BBC to report in depth on events outside Britain.

(b) the strength of signals in main target areas. My understanding is that East Africa is not very well-served presently.

(c) Is the liaison between FCO & BBC effective on its present lines especially

with political departments.

(d) what, if anything, can be done to get better liaison with BBC Tv, both for BBC's own External Services and for FCO.

(e) in what areas are the BBC themselves most fearful of losing impact because of the activities of their competitors

(f) what opportunities do they think exist for their making any impact with transcribed as opposed to directly transmitted programmes, especially where their signal is indifferent.

But many other topics should emerge from any such dialogue.

4. My own view is that the value of this sort of informal review is particularly important for this department in order that we can in turn assess our own priorities before any formal discussions with IAD about the size, allocation, and handling of the Grant-in-Aid.




(J.D. Massingham)

4.VIII.70

Mr Hyde 13/8  
Mr Morgan 14/8 just  
Mr Gordon 12 Aug  
and back to me  
please.

There is <sup>also</sup> ~~of course~~ the problem that the External  
Services of the BBC with whom we mainly deal  
seem to have little or no say in the matter  
of BBC correspondents stationed abroad.

see para 3(a)  
date:



Amhagm  
18/5

Mr. Balfour:

BBC. Reporting on Jordan.

P. See Amman Tel. 395 & Beirut  
Tel. 66 at (10) & (11).

2. The earlier papers on the file record Amman's dissatisfaction with BBC coverage of events in Jordan and in paragraph 6 of his letter of (6) Mr. Graham emphasizes the point that the BBC's Middle East Correspondent usually never goes there. This point is made again - in the time of the Iranian authorities in paragraph 2 of the first diagram under reference.

3. In my own talks with the BBC Arabic Service it was clear that they were visiting Mr. Ivar Jones unwillingness to leave Beirut (they dismissed as specious his claim to be on official business call in Beirut itself) & their frustration that the External Services News Department did not control his movements.

4. I had suggested in my minute (to you of 11 July at (8)) that the problems of financing the BBC's Arabic Correspondent might usefully be taken up with them on an exploratory basis. Notwithstanding Mr. Hills' note that Mr. Reddaway had already started on this in talks with Hawaistic TV News, I recommended that either you or he might care to raise it in the specific context of the Middle East with BBC management. The cost of an application for the Arabic Service should

be sufficient justification for  
fully giving the BBC  
assurance that no internal  
changes will be made without  
prior consultation with the  
Sensitive Areas in a Standard  
Area. I believe that the External  
Services would welcome our  
interest in this; though, far as  
part we must bear in mind  
that the possible transfer of  
long wave from the present location  
would increase the cost of the  
proposition substantially.

V. J. Fairbank

(V.P. MASSINCRAFT)

3/VIII/71


P.S. See also Mr. Given's letter of 6 August,  
attached below

W.  
V. J. Fairbank

N E T

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF  
THE CHANCERY

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BEIRUT.



CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

13 August, 1970

(12)

Many thanks for your letter 69/1 of 6 August to Ben Strachan, who is on home leave, about Ivor Jones.

2. We have had a team from B.B.C. television with us this week who succeeded in getting an interview with the King. Zeid Rifai repeated his complaints about Ivor Jones to the leader of the team, Michael Blakey, and Blakey tells me that he has written to London to pass them on. I hope that this will produce some directive from headquarters to Jones to leave the comforts of Beirut occasionally and come to the source of most of the stuff he is putting out. Other Beirut based correspondents can do this - John Bullock is a regular visitor - and I am sure he could too.

3. I saw Zeid Rifai about another matter today and he repeated his strictures on Jones, who, he said, relied on taxi drivers from Amman and people he met in bars for his news. (I myself suspect that Jones also relies heavily on Reuters and the "Arab World".) Zeid Rifai also repeated his offer of an intensive briefing for Jones if he came here, and hinted strongly that he would try to persuade the King to see him. It is now really up to Jones.

4. You may be amused to learn that after a visit in 1967 Jones wrote to the Ambassador, who had suggested that he should come again, complaining that the air conditioning in the Intercontinental Hotel was too loud to enable him to work here!


(C. D. Lush)

E. F. Givens, Esq.,  
H. M. Embassy,  
BEIRUT.

c.c. Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter soon on ~~10/8~~ 11/8  
a/c/p to Mr. Remond, 190  
17/8 13  
128



RECEIVED IN	1
REGISTRY N	17
NEJ 13/1	

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

14 August, 1970

14

Dear Christopher,

As you may know, a B.B.C. television team visited Amman recently to make a programme which included an interview with King Hussein. Could you possibly obtain for us a transcript of the programme?

Yours sincerely

C. F. Carter.


(C. F. Carter)

Copy passed to Mr. Long - News Dept - Eng.  
T 25/8/70

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 August, 1970



*With the compliments of*

CHANCERY

C. D. Lush

Middle Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

BRITISH EMBASSY

P.O. BOX 87

AMMAN

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 AUG 1970	NEJ 13/1
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C. H. E. British Envoy,  
13

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
17 AUG 1970  
NEJ 1311

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

14 August, 1970

Dear Christopher,

As you may know, a B.B.C. television team visited Amman recently to make a programme which included an interview with King Hussein. Could you possibly obtain for us a transcript of the programme?

Yours sincerely,

C. P. Carter.

(C. P. Carter)


C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

John  
The interview was given by King Hussein to BBC TV News.  
I have been in touch and they will ring back tomorrow (28 August)  
as to whether it is possible to make a transcript.

G. Abbott  
27/8/70

NEJ 1311

M. Weale we fight.



John Attwells  
Gloss.  
2/3

GISTRY II. 1

*With the compliments of*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

N.E.D.

R.115.

D.S.W.

1970 PP

M.P.W.  
PP

24/3/71

17 Aug 1970. (Reid 24/8 J.W.).  
LONDON, S.W.1

218  
1100  
a/cpt to Mr. Longworth, IPD  
17/8

14A

PW  
31)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

14 August, 1970

Dear Christopher,

NET 15/1

As you may know, a B.B.C. television team visited Amman recently to make a programme which included an interview with King Hussein. Could you possibly obtain for us a transcript of the programme?

You sincerely,

C. P. Carter.

(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O. W13

~~Mr. Long~~  
Transcript attached.  
J.W.L.

~~Mr. Long~~  
X

(New York).

The N.Y. file containing the original  
of this letter is presently in  
action with the Dept. It  
was noted that matters stood  
about this particular request.

2. If — as I think may be so —  
I have this in hand, Cairo  
please let Mr. Lang of  
Arabia Dej. know.



New Eastern

S.A.  
M. Longworth  
G104 28/VIII

c/o Mr. Birmingham  
GIPD.

RESTRICTED

Enter on 21/8



10/3

BRITISH EMBASSY,

ARTIAN.

NE51371

18 August, 1970

Dear Christopher,

The Fedayeen and the B.B.C.

The B.B.C. has come under fire from fedayeen sources a couple of times in the past ten days. An editorial in "Fatah" of 7 August accused the B.B.C. of misrepresentation, in stating that two fedayeen groups had come out against the cease fire, whereas in fact the whole resistance movement, represented by the Central Committee, had done so.

2. More important were accusations made by Issam Sartawi at a press conference on 10 August - the same press conference at which he and Ahmad Za'rour retracted their support for President Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. proposals. The B.B.C. and the Beirut daily "Al-Hayat", he claimed, had been putting it about that his organisation (the A.C.L.P.) favoured a peaceful settlement, even though in fact the Action Organisation strongly opposed any attempts to "liquidate" the Palestine cause. The B.B.C. had been seeking to create confusion among the masses, and the misleading news which they had broadcast was directly responsible for the recent armed clashes between the Action Organisation and the P.F.L.P.

3. Both these charges are symptomatic of the excitable mood of the fedayeen at this moment and need not be taken too tragically. They do, however, illustrate how sensitive people here are to news items that seem to them to get the subtleties of their position even the slightest bit wrong, especially when the culprit is the widely listened to and influential B.B.C. Arabic Service.

Mous ever,

  
(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

c.c. Chancery, Beirut.

RESTRICTED

(116)

Mr Massingham, G.I.P.D.

BBC reporting in ME

(EP)

We spoke. This file (with action by your department  
at your minute within) has returned to  
me ~~now~~ at the same time as a new  
letter of 18 August from Amman, which please  
see (attached behind).

2. I appreciate your political difficulties with  
BBC. But the long & short of it is  
that Mr Jones's shortcomings are damagey  
to the BBC's reputation (and hence ours) in  
Jordan & Lebanon, & we owe it to our  
Embassies in Beirut & Amman to make  
the point to BBC.

3. If you agree I should like to pass  
on BBC's reactions to the Embassy in due  
course.

Cheney  
NEB 21/8

Mr. Brinson

w (12)

(17)

B.B.C. Reporting in the Middle East

My minute of 4 August evidently did not recirculate to you and the papers have been recovered from N.E.D. with a further letter from Amman and a minute from Mr. Long.

2. We have still to decide how best we can draw the B.B.C.'s attention to the short-comings of their Middle East correspondent based in Beirut, Mr. Ivor Jones. As he is an out-posted member of the B.B.C.'s Domestic News Department, this would, I suggest, properly fall to our own News Department to handle. However, I am still inclined to recommend an oblique approach to the B.B.C. at high level whereby Jones' inadequacies might be raised within the context of the B.B.C.'s general representation throughout the Middle East. I have already touched on some of the reasons for this suggestion in my previous minutes but briefly they are:

- i) a bald complaint about Jones' sins of omission might lead only to an obtuse reaction from the B.B.C.'s Domestic News Services, which do not necessarily share our particular concern;
- ii) we need also to get some clarification of the anomalous position whereby coverage of the Middle East by the B.B.C. is shared between Jones (Domestic Service) based in Beirut and Challis (External Service) based in Cairo. Given Jones' admitted reluctance to move about, which I know irritates the authorities in Bush House, this arrangement means that a wide and crucial area of the Middle East, notably Jordan, is inadequately covered and the B.B.C.'s Arabic Service coverage of Middle East events - which is minutely examined by all the local Governments - inevitably suffers.

3. Perhaps we could have a further word about this.



(J.D. Massingham)  
24 August, 1970

Confidential

65/1

British Embassy,  
BEIRUT

29 August, 1970.

NES 13/1

Mr Birmingham

This seems right

you start.

G (PD) for each

(including - and why not  
8/9)

13  
18  
13  
7 Sept

My dear Norman

B.B.C. External Services

There has recently been a three-cornered correspondence between the FCO, Amman and ourselves about complaints from the Jordanian authorities that Ivor Jones, the BBC Middle East correspondent, reports extensively on events in Jordan with hardly a visit to the place. The original complaint is in Amman telegram number 77 of 28 July to Beirut, repeated to the FCO; the last letter in the series is Christopher Lush's letter 65/3 C 13 13 13 13 13, referring to the FCO's Department.

2. I naturally took this up with Jones himself. By pure coincidence he went to Amman, on instructions from London, to cover the Palestine National Congress, immediately after our last talk. In the course of more than one discussion Jones insisted that his instructions did not allow him to go to Amman, or anywhere else outside Beirut, unless he could be assured of some very important interview, such as with King Hussein, in which case he would be able to get permission from his masters at home. At the end of one session, with a good deal of架 (arrogance), he showed me in the strictest confidence, with pleas that the BBC should never learn that he had shown the paper to me, his instructions from London, which are open to the interpretation which he places on them. He is instructed that he is to work exclusively for the Home Services, both sound and vision, and that their particular interest is one-minute spot items. The longer pieces for news reels are no longer wanted because the reels have themselves disappeared. Jones interprets this as meaning that he has to be available in Beirut to produce these one-minute squirts of instant news, because this is the only place from which he can get a decent transmission when he wants it; Beirut now has excellent communications with the U.K. by satellite. If he leaves in search of news, or merely to get background, he may be caught out in some place such as Amman where the censorship is tiresome and communications are poor, and in times of crisis are usually interrupted.


3. If this were the whole of the story it would of course be no business of ours. But the World and Arabic Services pick up Jones' pieces, and preface them with something like "The BBC Middle East Correspondent in Beirut reports that ....", sometimes

/with

G F. N. Reddaway, Esq., C.B.E.,  
F.C.C.

Confidential

Confidential



65/1

..

with his name. He also from time to time sends back despatches at greater length which are carried on the World Service, and presumably not at home; these are asked for specially. As Amman say, the customers resent being reported on from Beirut by a man who hardly ever goes near them, and who notoriously relies on informants who report to him by telephone, on the Beirut press, and perhaps more reliably on Reuters. This brings the BBC only discredit, and blows upon our greatest information asset. At this point I think it becomes our business.

4. I don't know whether it is profitable to tackle the BBC about this sort of thing, but if so I hope you will do it. If they should ask you what could be done about it, you might perhaps suggest to them that they adopt the practice used by the Daily Telegraph, which maintains two men here. One of them is always available in Beirut while the other can travel, either to follow up news stories or to get background. The BBC have a World Service man (our old chum Roland Challis) in Cairo, where I don't think he is too happy; the censorship is troublesome and I believe it is easier for visiting firemen to get interviews with the top men in the UAR than for resident correspondents; he covers the Middle East as a whole, with more widely drawn boundaries than Jones. If the BBC were to put both men together in one place and make them interchangeable, then one could be available to provide the Home Services with their instant news, while the other could, like the Telegraph man, go where the action is, or merely keep up his contacts and brush up his knowledge of the background. To avoid the kind of accusation which comes to us from Amman, the two men would have to take it in turns. I have no particular brief for having them in Beirut, but we are always assured that the facilities, both telecommunications and airlines, are so much better here than anywhere else in the region, and there is no censorship, so perhaps it is the best place.

5. This would get over the objections which have been raised to the BBC's present policy, without too much extra expense, if any. It would save the rather ridiculous situation of having two men who overlap almost completely, report from different places with little mutual contact, and work for different parts of the same organisation. No doubt the split between the Home and External Services will be advanced as an objection to any such scheme, but I know how you view such manifestations of bureaucracy !

*Yours  
John*


(E. F. Given)

Confidential

15  
19

Ministerial Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

(NEJ 13/1)



pm un  
31)

14

new letter of 1st August  
the S.S.C. I now  
for. It looks incomplete  
tion, as edited for  
on introduced by a  
... 'and I asked him,  
... a peaceful settlement

J. W. Carter, Esq.,  
...man.

KING HUSSEIN: It's too difficult for me to state in advance what the chances are, but I'm definitely much more optimistic than I was a short while ago.

BLAKEY: What would you say are the main obstacles to peace in the Middle East?

KING HUSSEIN: I don't know what the obstacles are; they certainly have a great deal to do with Israel's basic position, I believe they've always had the choice of territory or peace, but they couldn't have territory and have peace at the same time. Let's hope now that there may be this chance and maybe through positive positions that could be adopted through the implementation of .... we could have peace in ....

BLAKEY: What kind of terms would you be prepared to settle for, Your Majesty?

KING HUSSEIN: There are basically two positions, two objectives as far as we're concerned; one the liberation of all our occupied territories, occupied in June of this year; the second the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, the rights recognised by the United Nations so many times in the past. More than that I don't think it is prudent or constructive to state specific positions at this stage, the place to do so would be in the near future when - I understand when the effort really begins with the help of Mr. Jarring to move forward towards the establishment of a just and durable peace.

BLAKEY: Where would you wish these talks to take place?

KING HUSSEIN: I have no idea where they will take place, but there is an impression they might take place in New York, in fact.

BLAKEY: Many people outside your country feel that one obstacle to any move towards peace are the Commandos and the Fedayeen in Jordan itself - do you feel that they are an obstacle because they have said that they intend to go on fighting?

KING HUSSEIN: I don't believe anybody fights just for the sake of fighting, or is interested in doing so. It is only in the lack of hope, the lack of progress towards an end that has caused this to happen during the past period. Nothing has changed basically, right now there is this new initiative and there is some hope, but a great deal depends on what happens from now.

AP

CYPHER CAT/-A  
FLASH REIRUT  
TELEGRAM NO.. 447

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F.C.O. *12 SEPTEMBER 1970* COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Pm  
15/9

ADDRESSED TO F C O TEL NO 447 OF 12 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AND AMMAN AND PRIORITY TO CAIRO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

B B C REPORTING ON JORDAN.

NET 13/1

IVOR JONES, B B C MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT, HAS TOLD US THAT HE IS ABOUT TO SEND A DESPATCH IN WHICH HE REPORTS RELIABLE SOURCES AS TELLING HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL ARE PLANNING JOINT MILITARY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. JONES'S SOURCES ARE OF COURSE HEARSAY OR WORSE.

2. IF SUCH A STORY IS CARRIED ON THE WORLD OR ARABIC SERVICE IT COULD PROVOKE TROUBLE. WE HAVE THEREFORE TRIED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO PERSUADE JONES NOT TO USE IT, BUT HE INSISTS THAT IF HE DOES NOT HIS RIVALS WILL, AND HE WILL BE CRITICISED BY THE B B C. HE DID UNDER PRESSURE SAY THAT HE WOULD INCLUDE A DENIAL HE HAS HAD FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, BUT THIS WOULD NOT UNDO THE HARM WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED BY THE STORY RECEIVING THE CACHET OF THE B B C.

3. WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE B B C NOT RPT NOT TO USE THIS STORY ON ITS EXTERNAL SERVICES.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND PRIORITY TO PARIS

MR EDDEN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/MII/DISTRIBUTION:  
H.E.D.

ADDL. DISTRIBUTION:  
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

**(2)**  
I  
**CYpher CAT/A**  
**FLASH DISTRUT**  
**TELEGRAM NO. 448**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TO F.C.O.**

**12 SEPTEMBER 1970**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 448 OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV AND AMMAN AND  
PRIORITY TO CAIRO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

**M.I.P.T. (21) BBC REPORTING ON JORDAN.**

JONES NOW SAYS QUOTE YOUR INTERVENTION WITH LONDON HAS BEEN  
AS EFFECTIVE AS YOU COULD HAVE WISHED UNQUOTE. PRESUMABLY  
THE RESULT OF AMERICAN ACTION.

**F.C.O. PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PRIORITY TO PARIS.**

**MR EDDEN**

**[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]**

**FCO/AMM/DISTRIBUTION:**

**ADDL. DISTRIBUTION:**

**N.E.D.**


**ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT**

*Pm  
15/9*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

G.P.D

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy,

Beirut.

18 September, 1970

Dear Christopher.

NET/13/1

B.B.C. Middle East Correspondent

I have often encountered such a depth of journalistic irresponsibility as that reported in Beirut telegram No. 447 of 12 September about Iver Jones, the B.B.C. Middle East correspondent.

2. When Jones told me what he intended to report, he had the nerve to ask if I could give him any information to substantiate the information that he already had. I told him that we had no information, and that I did not believe the story. I pointed out that to put out a story of this kind could precipitate serious trouble, and endanger British lives. Jones insisted that his duty to his employers required him to put out the story.

3. I naturally alerted the American Charge who was very angry indeed: I had great difficulty in restraining him from telephoning Jones at once to give him a piece of his mind, but he finally agreed to confine his action to telegrams to London and Washington. However, to give Houghton an opportunity of saying his piece, I suggested to Jones that he should check his story with the American Embassy. Jones replied that he had done so earlier and had received the reply that they had no knowledge of any such plans. He added that a very reliable contact of his had been told by the Americans privately that "a certain amount of muscle flexing was going on". The Americans deny flatly that Jones has ever been near them in this context.

4. The incident raises the very serious question whether any pressure should be put on the B.B.C. to replace Jones. He is a very odd character, and I am never sure if his curious manner is something he was born with or if he is just fuddled. He always shows a regrettable tendency to inflate any story, and great reluctance to have anything to do with original sources. He sits in his flat in Beirut and receives messages by telephone from various contacts, who may themselves be passing on gossip or other second-hand material, a peculiarly hazardous game in a place like Beirut. A typical example of his method is that he telephoned to us to ask for the passenger list of the hijacked B.O.A.C. aircraft when he could have got full details direct from B.O.A.C. Another, also connected with the hijacking, was that he heard that one of the hostages was a British Adviser to one of the Gulf Rulers; he maintained that this "inescapably" meant that the man was a British Government servant. We pointed out that this was not so, but Jones insisted that "the operative word is inescapably". In fact, when he gets a bee into his bonnet, nothing will shift him. As the bees buzz so loudly as to drown the voice of reason, this can be dangerous.

5. This would not matter if Jones were the correspondent of a newspaper, but when his inventions and gossip are played back to the Middle East with all the authority of the B.B.C. we should perhaps take some notice.

Yours

John Given  
(E. F. Given)

6/10

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

CHIEF CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE BEIRUT  
TELEGRAM NO. 465

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
19 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG 190740Z

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 465 OF 19 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN.  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 347. TO AMMAN : B.B.C.

248 NES 1/4  
CIVIL WAS ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH CHALLIS  
AND HAS PASSED ON SUCH INFORMATION AS WE HAD.  
HE WILL BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN FUTURE. BUT  
FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS WE HAVE VERY LITTLE  
TO SAY AND IT IS GENERALLY TOO LATE FOR  
THE B.B.C.'S PURPOSES.

MR. EDDEN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION  
H.Q.D.

AV. & TELE. DEPT.  
G.T.P.D.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
ATMOSIS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

B. M.M.

2714

CYPHER CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE BEIRUT  
TELEGRAM NO.468

CONFIDENTIAL  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
19 SEPTEMBER 1970

(19)

(24)

CONFIDENTIAL 190910Z

(23)

MY TELEGRAM NO.465 : B.B.C.

WE HAVE JUST PASSED TO CHALLIS THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE  
TO US UP TO NOW.

NEJ 13/8/1

2. CHALLIS IS RETURNING TO CAIRO TOMORROW, AND  
BEING REPLACED HERE BY PETER FLYNN FROM B.B.C.  
NEWS STAFF. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, WE  
WILL BRIEF FLYNN AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR TELNO.347 TO AMMAN.  
FLYNN AND IVOR JONES WILL BE WORKING ALTERNATE 24 HOURS,  
BUT FOR REASONS WHICH SHOULD BE APPARENT FROM MY  
TEJUX KBPO.447 OF 12 SEPTEMBER WE ARE NOT DISPOSED  
TO TAKE JONES AS FAR INTO OUR CONFIDENCE  
AS WE HAVE TAKEN CHALLIS AND PROPOSE TO TAKE FLYNN.  
THIS MAY LEAD TO SOME PATCHINESS, BUT WE FEAR THAT  
JONES WILL TEND TO USE OUR INFORMATION AS JUSTIFICATION  
FOR HIS OWN INVENTIONS RATHER THAN FOR STRAIGHT  
REPORTING.

NET 1/4

b/10

*Mr. Muennich  
with  
evidence of  
unreliability?*  
Jones

*AMThom*

22/1.

MR. EDDEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

MI STAFF  
N.E.D.  
A.& T.D.  
G.I.P.D.  
NEWS D.

ADDL. DISTRIBUTION:

ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

CEPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY TEL AVIV  
TELEGRAM NO 899

RESTRICTED  
TOP COPY WITH  
Q.I.P.O.  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
23 SEPTEMBER 1970

RESTRICTED

NET 13/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 899 OF 23/9/70 RFI PRIORITY TO AMMAN  
AND BEIRUT.

NET 1/4

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 347 TO AMMAN: BBC.

for  
me

6/10

TODAY'S JERUSALEM POST STRONGLY CRITICISES THE WORLD SERVICE FOR REPRODUCING FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDA. SPECIFICALLY, THE PAPER COMPLAINS ABOUT THE BBC'S REFERENCE TO "THE LIBERATED ZONE" UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL IN NORTH JORDAN. IT ALSO QUOTES A BBC COMMENTATOR AS SPEAKING OF "THE ISRAELI TAIL WAGGING THE AMERICAN DOG AFTER THE SOVIETS HAVE CAUSED THEIR EGYPTIAN ALLY TO TOE THE LINE ALONG THE CANAL".

2. INFORMATION OFFICER IS SENDING THE ARTICLE TO THE BBC. MEANWHILE GRATEFUL FOR ANY GUIDANCE YOU CAN GIVE US ON THE SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH AND MORE GENERALLY ON THE BBC'S RECENT REPORTING OF THE JORDAN CRISIS.

MR. BARNES.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

A. & T. D.

G.I.P.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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CONFIDENTIAL

436

26  
26

Mr. Eriksen

Mr. Reddaway

18

NE-S 13/1

B.B.C. EXTERNAL SERVICES

Flag A Mr. Given's letter of 29 August (I am sorry that other priorities and my subsequent indisposition has delayed this submission).

" B 2. Meanwhile, further evidence of Ivor Jones' shortcomings has emerged with Beirut telegram 447 of 12 September and Mr. Given's subsequent letter of 18 September.

" C

20

22

3. I have - as asked by Mr. Reddaway - taken some further soundings in Bush House to discover what solutions, if any, could be elicited from there about how Jones might be effectively "neutralised" or replaced. As on previous occasions I found that all concerned - in the Arabic Service and the News Department are fully alive to the problem but generally inclined - as Mr. Given himself predicted in the final sentence of his first paragraph under reference - to cite the dichotomy between the Domestic Services' and External Services News Divisions as an insuperable obstacle. At the level at which I can deal this is probably a fair point. Moreover, I detect also an understandable reluctance to join in a conspiracy (as it were) with an outsider to undermine or remove a colleague however much such a move would be welcomed. I regret, therefore, having to report having drawn a blank: no constructive tactical ploy has been put forward.

4. In the circumstances I can only reiterate my previous recommendation that Jones' shortcomings be mooted informally at a high level (Mr. Oliver Whitley) and that Mr. Given be sent an interim reply on the lines of the attached draft.

Yes

Issue to Mr. P.

KD

CONFIDENTIAL

28 Sep

17.8.29/1.

now see new  
mem-to  
and  
6/10

CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 666

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL  
261000Z

BBC ARABIC SERVICE.

MAJOR GENERAL MA'AN ABU NOWAR HAS COMPLAINED TO US OF THE VERY ANTI JORDANIAN TONE OF THE ARABIC SERVICE IN CONTRAST TO THE ENGLISH WORLD SERVICE.

2. HE ALLEGED FOR EXAMPLE THAT THE ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH WAS INTERLARDED WITH SARCASTIC ASIDES FROM THE ANNOUNCER.

3. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE BBC SHOULD REFLECT THE WIDESPREAD HORROR AT EVENTS IN AMMAN, IT IS NOT HELPFUL IF THE BBC ARAB ANNOUNCERS GRATUITOUSLY EXACERBATE THE EMOTIONAL TENSION HERE.

MR. PHILLIPS [COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST AND TO CABINET OFFICE FOR SIR R. HOOPER]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.  
G.I.P.D.  
NEWS DEPT  
EMERGENCY STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY  
WITH G.I.P.D.

(27)  
TOP COPE

NET 13/1

TOP  
TUN  
6/10

Grubman Dept (Mr. Thomas),  
re teleb. with this letter  
Pl. see copy of draft of their  
letter att.

Enclosed  NEJ  
answ 28/9

NEJ 131

Emergency Unit

cc. Sir P. Adams  
NED

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

10289

September 27, 1970



Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has seen Amman tel. No. 660 of September 26, conveying a Jordanian complaint about the B.B.C. Arabic service. The Prime Minister has asked what has been done about this.

Top Copy with  
A+T.D.

Yours sincerely  
R. H. Wilson

I. McCluney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Reply at file 8 PBM 5/505/2  
GIRD file (1970)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS	(Date)
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified	Flash } Immediate } Priority Routine	Despatched
<u>PRIORITY</u>		
<p>[Security classification—if any] CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>[Privacy marking—if any]</p> <p>[Codeword—if any]</p> <p>Addressed to .....</p> <p>telegram No..... (date) .....</p> <p>And to .....</p> <p>repeated for information to .....</p> <p>Saving to .....</p>		
<p><i>Draft Telegram to:—</i></p> <p>No. ....</p> <p>(Date) .....</p> <p>And to:—</p> <p><i>Repeat to:—</i></p> <p>Your Tel No. 666. BBC Arabic Service .</p> <p>We have consulted the Head of the Arabic Service who says that the Arabic Service continually supervises all broadcasts to prevent "Ad Lib" comments and check all output.</p> <p>2. Only Prime Minister's speech broadcast recently was resignation statement by Daud. No asides were interlarded. Nor were any in reports of Mr. Heath's television interview.</p> <p>3. We fully share your concern but in the light of the above the E.F.C. and ourselves suspect that the complaint may be based on a distorted version. Can you shed any further light, perhaps in the form of a first hand report of the offending broadcast? When did it take place and was the announcer male or female?</p>		
<p><i>Copies to:—</i></p> <p>No. 10 Downing Street</p>		

LHF E 091/96  
LIL 095/13

PP FCO

GRS 123 ~~overjoined~~ straight  
is 10 ft. off!

TO SECRETARY AND COMMUNAL OFFICE  
25 SEPTEMBER 1970

Депутат

CONFIDENTIAL  
261000Z

# **NBC ARABIC SERVICE.**

MAJOR GENERAL MARYAN ABDU KOWAR HAS COMPLAINED TO US OF THE VERY  
LITTLE DEDICATED TIME OF THE ARABIC SERVICE IN CONTRAST TO THE  
ENGLISH WORLD SERVICE.

AS HE ALLEGED FOR EXAMPLE WITH THE ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
SUCCESSION WAS INTERLINED WITH SARCASTIC QUOTES FROM THE ANNOUNCER.

3. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE BBC SHOULD REFLECT THE WIDESPREAD HORROR AT EVENTS IN AMMAN, IT IS NOT HELPFUL IF THE BBC MAKE ANNOUNCERS OBVIOUSLY EXACERBATING THE EMOTIONAL TENSION HERE.

W.H. PHILLIPS CO

Monks  
of the  
Buddhist

Mr. Thompson  
is a  
man  
of  
many  
talents.  
He  
is  
a  
good  
writer,  
and  
a  
good  
lecturer.  
He  
is  
a  
good  
teacher,  
and  
a  
good  
preacher.  
He  
is  
a  
good  
business  
man,  
and  
a  
good  
politician.  
He  
is  
a  
good  
citizen,  
and  
a  
good  
neighbor.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT *NFI*

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s).

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified	Flash } Immediate } Priority Routine

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
in Clear. Code Cypher.....

Draft Telegram to:  
Alan Hart  
No. *H12*  
(Date) *28/9*  
(And to:-)

Repeat to:-

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

*Reis & Co*

Copies to:-

EXAMINED	28/9/02
SIGNATURE	<i>[Signature]</i>

(Date) *28/9*

Despatched *12/11*

[Security classification  
—if any]

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to \_\_\_\_\_

telegram No. \_\_\_\_\_ (date) \_\_\_\_\_

And to \_\_\_\_\_

repeated for information to \_\_\_\_\_

Saving to \_\_\_\_\_

Please pass

Following for Bill Spear *from BBC, Regas.*

As you may know, whole of HI interview used in Panorama Special 10.00 p.m. Saturday evening peak viewing time, so your efforts on our behalf not only vastly appreciated but also very worthwhile. Interview also transmitted simultaneously over satellite and Eurovision. Grateful if you inform HI of its success. Special thanks to your wife for tolerating us. Letter to follow. Warmest regards to all.

Alan Hart, Panorama, B.B.C. *R.H.*

*JP*

*28.9.*

NES 13/1

(29)

U HER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 418

TO AMMAN  
23 SEPTEMBER  
(RE).

CONFIDENTIAL. 231100Z.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FOR BILL SPEARES FROM BBC.

BEGINS.

AS YOU MAY KNOW, WHOLE OF OUR INTERVIEW USED IN PANORAMA SPECIAL 11.30 P.M. SATURDAY EVENING PEAK VIEWING TIME, SO YOUR EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF NOT ONLY VASTLY APPRECIATED BUT ALSO VERY VALUABLE. INTERVIEW ALSO TRANSMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY OVER SATELLITE AND EUROVISION. GRATEFUL IF YOU INFORM H.E. OF ITS SUCCESS. SPECIAL THANKS TO YOUR WIFE FOR TOLERATING US. LETTER TO FOLLOW. WARMEST REGARDS TO ALL. ALAN HART, PANORAMA, B.B.C.  
ENDS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

FILES:

H.E.D.  
SIR P. ADAMS

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

30  
SAC

(NEJ 13/1)

29 September 1970.

Reute  
ur  
b/w

B.R.C. Middle East Correspondent

Thank you for your letter of 29 August about Ivor Jones' shortcomings.

2. We have been preoccupied recently with the immediate tactical problems of the BBC's coverage of the current crisis and the longer term question of what to do about Jones has rather faded into the background. It is something about which we have been thinking for some time but it has not been easy to see any effective way of achieving his removal. As you yourself mention, internal divisions offer him strong protection. In Bush House generally there is a disenchantment with him that matches our own; but there seems equally to be a dearth of ideas about what can be done.

3. Your letter of 18 September to Christopher Low adds a new dimension to the case against Jones, for this is the first recorded sin of commission in a long list of omissions. I shall try to use this 'good effect' and, when the dust settles in Jordan, it might prove a propitious time to tackle the BBC on this delicate topic. (They have and continue to be remarkably helpful in the crisis).

4. I shall keep you and John Phillips - to whom I am sending a copy of this letter - in touch on this.

B.U. 20 October

(G. F. N. Reddaway)

E. F. Given, Esq., C.M.G.,  
British Embassy,  
BEIRUT.

P.A. 24/9

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Mr. G. J. P. D.~~

I have  
made a  
B. J. of  
20 Volts.  
opt  
3 ft

F.G.J.  
28 December  
no action  
cc  
opt  
q. II

Mr. Massingham, G.I.P.D.

~~NE Regs~~  
~~P. B. 20/6/70~~  
~~noted in~~  
~~9/6 7/60~~

BBC: Jordan

This file has just returned to me.  
Someone has marked files. 26 and  
30 for "p.a.", although this is an  
NET file. But more important, it is  
not clear whether action is in fact  
complete: it looks to me as if  
there is still action on para. 4.

At your minute at 26, the  
"informal meeting of Mr Jones's  
shortcomings at a high level."  
Has this been done? If so,  
what result? I think we  
should let Amman & Bent know  
in due course.

CWMS  
NED 6/10

Mr. Grey Many thanks.  
7/10

Mr. Washington is still  
not here.

I am the guilty party  
who P.A.ed. (26) and (30)  
prematurely and on another department's  
file! I am sorry.  
However, please now see  
our Assistant. (Cliff Hill.)  
B.U. for Oct 20.

O R Grey  
7/10  
G.I.P.D.

W(3)

CONFIDENTIAL

Top copy  
G.I.P.D.

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 422.

TO AMMAN.

28 SEPTEMBER 1970.

(N.E.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

281630Z.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 666: BBC ARABIC SERVICE.

WE HAVE CONSULTED THE HEAD OF THE ARABIC SERVICE WHO SAYS THAT THE ARABIC SERVICE CONTINUALLY SUPERVISE ALL BROADCASTS TO PREVENT QUOTE AD LIB UNQUOTE COMMENTS AND CHECK ALL OUTPUT.

2. ONLY PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH BROADCAST RECENTLY WAS RESIGNATION STATEMENT BY DAUD. NO ASIDES WERE INTERLARDED. NOR WERE ANY IN REPORTS OF MR. HEATH'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

3. WE FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THE BBC AND OURSELVES SUSPECT THAT THE COMPLAINT MAY BE BASED ON A DISTORTED VERSION. CAN YOU SHED ANY FURTHER LIGHT, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A FIRST HAND REPORT OF THE OFFENDING BROADCAST? WHEN DID IT TAKE PLACE AND WAS THE ANNOUNCER MALE OR FEMALE.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

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N.E.D.

G.I.P.D.

NEWS DEPT.

EMERGENCY STAFF

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P.ente x P  
NEJ/B/1 cur  
21/10

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

29 September, 1970.

... Thank you for your letter of 27 September about Amman Tel. No. 660 which complained about the BBC Arabic Service.

You will have seen a copy of our Tel. No. 422 in reply but for ease of reference I enclose a copy herewith.

(Sgd.) I. McCluney

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street.

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